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The Global Financing Facility (GFF) was initiated in
2015 to contribute to filling the existing financing
gap to implement the United Nations’ “Global
Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and Adolescents’
Health (2016–2030)”, with the objectives of ending
preventable deaths and achieving a better quality
of life for women, children, and adolescents in
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). It
aims to contribute to universal health coverage
(UHC) with high-impact, cost-effective interven-
tions in areas that are often underfunded, such
as sexual and reproductive health and rights
(SRHR), by mobilising additional resources for
reproductive, maternal, neonatal, child, and ado-
lescent health and nutrition (RMNCAH-N).
The GFF, a platform bringing together different
stakeholders in RMNCAH-N, manages a multi-
donor trust fund at the World Bank to catalyse
additional funding for RMNCAH-N and SRHR pro-
jects in 67 potentially eligible countries based on
gross national income (GNI), disease burden, and
unmet need related to SRHR. Country grants
from this fund are intended to leverage loans
from the World Bank, specifically the International
Development Association (IDA) and International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD), to finance RMNCAH-N activities. The GFF
states that 30% of its funds will go to family plan-
ning1 in the beneficiary countries, putting SRHR
high on the agenda.
When joining the GFF, governments commit to
developing the RMNCAH-N Investment Case,
which determines priorities for the national strat-
egy for women’s, children’s and adolescents’
health, and defines which interventions will be
part of the funded benefit package. The GFF
grant itself is meant to pay for a fraction of this
comprehensive strategy but allows the leveraging
of loans for health, thus potentially increasing
total health expenditure, provided that the govern-
ment commitment remains at the same level and
that the resources will not become fungible. The
country-specific “Project Appraisal Documents”,
developed by the World Bank, explain how these
resources will be spent over the project’s lifespan,
usually five years. While governments are expected
to raise most resources domestically, international
donors can also contribute. As part of the process,
the GFF also aims to stimulate the development or
revision of an up-to-date sector-wide health finan-
cing strategy to indicate how revenues will be
raised sustainably and allocated efficiently.
In 2018, the GFF was successfully replenished
with above an additional US$ 1 billion from a var-
iety of donors, including bilateral cooperation
agencies, the European Union, private sector
donors and foundations. With nine new countries
joining in 2019, the GFF expanded to a current
total of 36 beneficiary countries worldwide, one
third categorised as “fragile and conflict-affected
states”.2 By 2030, the GFF envisions covering the
50 of the 67 eligible countries that are most in
need regarding RMNCAH-N. As of June 2019, US$
629 million was committed in 27 countries with
an additional US$ 4.8 billion from IDA/IBRD
funds. However, only US$ 120 million from GFF
and US$ 901.5 million from IDA/IBRD are dis-
bursed so far.2
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After five years of implementation in a high var-
iety of country contexts, a “Strategy Refresh”3 and a
governance reform of the GFF Investors Group have
been announced. We find it timely to take stock of
how the GFF has been operating at global and
country level, how it has been governed and
whether it has achieved its objectives. We will
first present the GFF governance model including
recent developments, and then focus on aspects
of two strong GFF promises: increasing domestic
resource mobilisation for health, and strengthen-
ing health systems. We base the following com-
mentary on observations in GFF countries – such
as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda
– that include stakeholder interviews and were
already part-published as briefing papers,4 as well
as on GFF-specific documents including from other
GFF countries. The country briefing papers were
informed by a variety of stakeholders in the respect-
ive countries and put together by Wemos Foun-
dation together with national partners (The Center
for Human Rights and Development in Uganda,
Health Promotion Tanzania, Malawi Health Equity
Network, and WACI Health Kenya).
From model to country reality
As reported by the GFF, indicators have started to
show improvements in health care provision and
delivery in at least seven recipient countries
(DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tan-
zania and Uganda), following a trend that had
begun for these countries in the era of the Millen-
nium Development Goals. For instance, antenatal
coverage in Tanzania has improved from 35.8%
of women receiving four antenatal care visits in
2014 to 64.1% in 2018. In Nigeria, the government
committed to increasing the budget allocated to
the basic health care provision fund, providing a
free minimum benefit package that included ante-
natal care, facility-based delivery, family planning,
and other services to all Nigerians.2 Of course, it is
important to note that a variety of external part-
ners have been contributing to the health sectors
in GFF countries and, therefore, that improve-
ments in health indicators can be attributed
neither to the GFF-linked investments, nor to any
other single source of funding.
Country studies in three out of the seven
countries mentioned in the GFF’s Annual Report
as well as others, however, reveal challenges in
different aspects of the GFF model.4 GFF and
World Bank representatives, as well as recipient
government officials, have been found to fail to
align with GFF-stated core values such as transpar-
ency and inclusiveness for all stakeholders and
specifically for civil society. Furthermore, there
are concerns about the level of domestic resource
mobilisation that the GFF has achieved, and how
this translates into more investment in health
with the potential to address key health system
bottlenecks such as insufficient numbers of
employed health workers.5
Governance issues at global level
Three key bodies collectively govern the GFF at
global level. The Trust Fund Committee (TFC), a
set of donor representatives contributing over
US$ 30 million each annually and World Bank
representatives, has the main decision-making
power. For example, it decides which countries
are eligible to benefit from GFF Trust Fund sup-
port and approves the selection of countries for
GFF Trust Fund financing. It also provides strategic
guidance, defines the principles and priorities of
the GFF, reviews the annual plans and approves
the allocation of GFF financing to global public
goods.6 The TFC is strategically advised by the
Investors Group, a now 32-seat multi-stakeholder
group including financially and technically contri-
buting donors, civil society, private sector, and
recipient country representatives. The seats of
recipient country representatives increased from
four to nine in the recent Investors Group reform.
This large and heterogeneous group of stake-
holders in RMNCAH-N is intended to contribute
with diverse and comprehensive expertise. The
GFF Secretariat supports the TFC and Investors
Group and carries out GFF operations and daily
management.
Given the multitude of stakeholders involved
in GFF governance, there have been challenges
regarding each group’s mandate. The Investors
Group commissioned an independent review to
clarify the roles of the TFC, the Secretariat and
its own, in order to increase effectiveness and
accountability.7 This review resulted in an Inves-
tors Group governance reform plan, presented
and decided on in November 2019, that included
a refinement of the Investors Group functions. A
new governance document was approved includ-
ing the intention to foster joint ownership and
alignment around country platforms and
country-led investment cases; enhance health
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financing support in countries and increase the
total volume of health financing; systematically
review the GFF performance as a facility; and pro-
vide strategic advice to the TFC. Other decisions
include the institution of a co-chair function for
a country representative and the establishment
of two standing committees, one on country
engagement and one on monitoring country pro-
gress. However, this reform does not concern the
TFC. While representation of recipient countries
has now increased in the Investors Group, the
TFC, as a decision-making entity, does not include
representatives of recipient countries and civil
society, a concern already addressed to the GFF
Secretariat prior to the 2018 replenishment in
an open letter by civil society.8 The inclusion of
recipient country representatives in the TFC with
equal voting rights could ensure true ownership
of the GFF programmes in line with the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.9 One of the
TFC’s roles regards resource mobilisation and
the promotion of increased domestic resources
to support countries’ Investment Cases and
would benefit from active participation of recipi-
ents’ representatives.6
Civil society now holds 3 seats out of 32 at the
Investors Group, with alternates. The third seat
with its alternate, representing the youth constitu-
ency, was added in 2019, after combined advocacy
efforts of the global civil society community. Apart
from the newly created space in the Investors
Group, civil society needs to sit at the decision-mak-
ing table of the TFC with full voting power to make
best use of its knowledge, experience and expertise.
This guarantees that the GFF can fully leverage civil
society’s ability to promote and uphold good gov-
ernance, social accountability and legitimacy.
Importantly, the manner in which the GFF
multi-donor trust fund is set up necessitates
tight adherence to World Bank policies and
regulations. While the proximity between the
GFF and the World Bank carries advantages
such as low transaction costs, access to IDA/
IBRD financing and a rather small secretariat
compared to other global financing mechan-
isms, it also comes with a strict set of rules
that may limit the use of funds in line with
World Bank policy.
Governance issues at national level
At national level, the Country Platform (CPF), led by
the respective Ministry of Health, is the GFF’s
governance structure where key documents and
resource mobilisation plans are developed, and
coordination of technical assistance and monitor-
ing takes place. The CPF is meant to facilitate col-
laborative action, transparent decision-making
and mutual accountability at all stages of the plan-
ning, design, monitoring and evaluation of the
implementation of the Investment Case and health
financing strategy. Importantly, CPFs are supposed
to be built on existing country structures and local
systems, wherever possible, and not to create new
mechanisms. It is up to the country to formulate its
CPF, but the GFF suggests that the platform should
include representatives from the government, aca-
demia, adolescents and youth, donors and foun-
dations, other global financing mechanisms, UN
agencies, healthcare professional associations,
civil society and the private sector. Civil society is
in fact particularly recognised by the GFF as an
asset for improving the outcomes of the invest-
ments, due to their technical expertise and close-
ness with communities and health system
users.10 Since the GFF was launched, CPFs have
faced several challenges in different country
contexts.
Many CPFs remained non-functional or dor-
mant after their creation, e.g. in Tanzania and
Uganda, and the GFF’s principle of inclusivity was
hardly met in their setup.4 Civil society groups
are often not invited to meetings at the CPF in
an inclusive manner; governments often select
only a few, some hand-picked, and information
and meeting invitations are not shared in a timely
way. This leads to a lack of or late engagement of
civil society in setting priorities in Investment Case
development.11 Realising the sub-optimal func-
tioning of CPFs, the GFF employed Liaison Officers,
based in the Ministry of Health or World Bank
offices, to facilitate coordination and engagement
of the various stakeholder groups and encourage
an effective and inclusive government-led partner-
ship process.12 However, meaningful engagement
of civil society varies and challenges remain.4
With an ineffective governance setup at country
level, the GFF risks not achieving its objectives. As a
possible second round of funding approaches first-
wave GFF countries, the GFF now proposes the cri-
terion of a functioning CPF for further eligibility.
This criterion has also been adopted for new join-
ing countries. CPF assessments are currently taking
place, with the results expected by end 2020.13
Based on these assessments, the GFF is expected
to take additional measures to achieve full
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inclusiveness and transparency. Wemos Foun-
dation has reported that a fast-tracked approach
at country level could impede meaningful engage-
ment of all stakeholders involved.4
Domestic resource mobilisation
One of the main objectives of the GFF is to raise
additional resources from a variety of sources,
emphasising a model of partnership that unites
different actors around the same goal of improv-
ing the lives of women, children and adolescents.
However, emphasis has been put on leveraging
loans, combined with domestic resource mobilis-
ation, to raise additional funds for RMNCAH-N.
The 2018–19 Annual Report points to the GFF’s
success with governments allocating more
resources to health, both per capita and as a per-
centage of government expenditure, and support-
ing Ministries of Health to advocate for a higher
share of the government’s budget. However,
how much of this can be attributed to the GFF is
unclear, and a recent study suggests that the
GFF funds did not catalyse many new resources
in the majority of the nine countries studied.5
This was also expressed in the diagnostic report
commissioned by the GFF to provide input to
the current GFF’s Strategy Refresh process. The
development of health financing strategies to
guide governments on new and more efficient
ways to raise additional domestic resources
often lags behind in the GFF process, with several
beneficiary countries not having made progress to
date; for instance, Kenya and Malawi still lack a
final health financing strategy.4 The GFF now
puts less emphasis on requiring finalised health
financing strategies and changed its course focus-
ing on health financing reforms; however, the
specifics are still unknown.
The GFF intends to support Ministries of Health
to advocate for more funding for the health sector,
for instance in Côte d´Ivoire where the allocation to
health was declining despite increasing general
revenues. At the GFF replenishment conference,
the Ivorian government announced the commit-
ment of increasing the budget´s relative health
share by 15% annually. The GFF plans to further
build up its advocacy power with governments lob-
bying for more domestic resources for health.
Naturally, many of the alternative approaches
to raising additional resources for health touch
upon wide-ranging political and macroeconomic
challenges that go beyond the health sector, such
as the risk of high indebtedness and limited public
spending. The current COVID-19 pandemic will
fundamentally lower capacity for domestic
resource mobilisation and reshape fiscal space
for health in most countries.
Civil society can bring added value in addressing
these wider challenges in health financing with
alternative solutions. To do so successfully requires
that they are truly included and listened to in pol-
icy processes, without any fear of victimisation
from the government, in order to build their
capacity and strengthen their advocacy work.
Therefore, we expect the GFF to value and support
civil society independently, including groups active
in advocacy on health financing and those serving
a watchdog role.
Reducing financial barriers linked to out-
of-pocket expenditure (OOP)
It is well recognised that out of pocket expenditure
(OOP) is a key reason for women and children to
forego necessary health care, resulting in higher
neonatal, infant and maternal mortality.14 Women
especially can benefit from free care, making
them less dependent on their husband for health-
care-seeking decisions.15 Focusing on the health of
women, children, and adolescents, the GFF embeds
its interventions in a broader health systems
approach and means to contribute to UHC by redu-
cing financial barriers. It promotes the generation of
additional public resources for health and agrees to
support countries in moving away from user fees.
However, the GFF and the World Bank often fall
short in addressing OOP expenditures in their “Pro-
ject Appraisal Documents”.
Neither Investment Cases nor Project Appraisal
Documents systematically address the issue, as
they do not suggest measures to mitigate OOP.
The GFF Investment Case for Senegal, for instance,
as well as the World Bank/GFF Project Appraisal
Documents for Tanzania and Mozambique, fail to
mention OOP at all.16–18 Without proactive
measures to reduce user fees, they imply that
additional resources towards increased provision
of health services are unlikely to benefit the most
vulnerable and those most in need of care.
In fact, during the revision of health financing
strategies, the importance of reducing OOP is
rarely stressed and sometimes even increased
copayment schemes have been proposed.19
Additionally, as exemplified in the case of Nigeria,
when GFF Investment Cases do mention OOP
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reduction to improve equity, they may do so along
with strong promotion of the role of the private
sector for service delivery.20 They do not mention
the inherent tension between the delivery of
health services by private for-profit corporations
and the low or absent ability to pay for health ser-
vices among most people in eligible countries.
On the contrary, reduction of OOP and exemp-
tion of user fees should be in fact an indicator of
success for the GFF. The new monitoring commit-
tee of the Investors Group could include this in
order to make sure that the GFF contributes to
RMNCAH-N, SRHR and equity.
Strengthening the health workforce
The GFF Investment Case summarises the specific
country’s situation including population health
and the setup of the healthcare system, specifi-
cally regarding women, children, and adoles-
cents. It outlines the system’s bottlenecks and
the most cost-effective interventions. Of the 14
Investment Cases available on the GFF home-
page, 13 reflect in one way or another that the
lack of skilled health personnel is one of the
major bottlenecks hampering the provision of
good quality health services, e.g. counselling
for safe pregnancies and deliveries, safe abortion
and post-abortion care, as well as prevention and
treatment of sexual and reproductive health con-
ditions. The governments of Cameroon, Côte d
´Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia,
Mozambique, Senegal and Uganda refer to insuf-
ficient numbers of skilled health personnel in
their health systems in their respective Invest-
ment Cases while Bangladesh made the estab-
lishment of a high quality health workforce a
strategic objective. Tanzania set an increased
number of skilled health workers as a target
for 2020, and Guatemala formulated the goal
of a 60% increase of health personnel. A fit-for-
purpose, educated, motivated and supported
health workforce is core to the attainment of
SRHR but in many countries health workers per
population ratios fall short of WHO standards.
Even in countries that train enough health
workers – for example, in Uganda – governments
face severe challenges in employing the needed
number of doctors, nurses, and midwives.21
The GFF and the World Bank take this severe
lack of human resources into consideration,
investing in in-service training and incentive pro-
grammes for existing personnel in GFF projects.
Thus, they address, among others, health person-
nel shortages in rural or underserved areas, lack
of motivation, or a specific missing skillset.
While these efforts are important, this will fall
short of overcoming the key problem of insuffi-
cient health worker posts in the public sector.
Moreover, the loans that the GFF can leverage
can mostly not be allocated to expanding the
health workforce.22 Other donors motivated to
contribute to the national Investment Cases
might attend to this major bottleneck with the
creation of health posts. However, to our knowl-
edge this has not been the case so far in any of
the GFF countries.
It is urgently important to start dialogue with
Ministries of Finance and Health and other rel-
evant actors on ways to create new posts under
the government’s wage bill including lifting the
wage bill ceilings and recruitment freezes that
often confront governments of LMICs.23 In its cur-
rent form as a multi-donor trust fund, the GFF is
not sufficiently independent of the World Bank
and needs to follow Bank policy regulations
which do not foresee investments in recurrent
expenditures such as remuneration of health
workers. In order for the GFF to contribute to
increased numbers of health workers, the
World Bank would need to revise its way of allo-
cating funds and allow for more deliberate
investment in the social sector, in line with its
own human capital project launched in 2018.
Former World Bank President Dr. Jim Kim called
for a change in the mindset of global actors,
including the international financial institutions,
regarding their social spending policies.24 The
Investors Group could leverage its full potential
as advisory body to the TFC, initiating dialogue
between stakeholders on how to address the
shortage of health personnel constructively.
Another way for the GFF to become more deliber-
ate in how to invest resources would be a change
of the multi-donor trust fund model to a finan-
cial intermediary fund model. The Global Part-
nership for Education and the Global Fund to
fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria are both
examples of such a set-up, allowing for more
deliberate decision-making around funding
allocations.
Conclusions
With supporting the creation of the GFF, the
World Bank has shown willingness to collaborate
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with many other donors and country govern-
ments to invest in people’s health and moreover
in groups often left behind – women, children,
and adolescents – in order to contribute to the
Sustainable Development Goals. Though rela-
tively new in global health financing, the GFF
has rolled out to 36 LMICs and demonstrated
its agility reacting to emerging challenges, e.g.
by creating the new position of Liaison Officers
to facilitate information sharing targeted at
improved inclusion of all stakeholders. Yet chal-
lenges remain to fulfil its potential to strengthen
health systems and contribute to more equitable
health service delivery.
Inclusive and transparent governance at both
global and national levels is a crucial element of
effective GFF project development and
implementation, to achieve positive impacts on
population health, particularly among the most
vulnerable. This can only be achieved when the
model of partnership is taken seriously and all
key stakeholders are represented in the TFC,
with gender parity and inclusion of civil society
representing both the global North and the glo-
bal South. The recent governance reform process
focuses on the distribution of mandates among
the different governing bodies, but risks to stop
short of the necessary overhaul that assures
seats and voting power for recipient country
representatives and civil society in the main
decision-making body. An expanded reform pro-
cess that includes the TFC would better leverage
all stakeholders’ expertise for the GFF’s objectives
in RMNCAH-N, SRHR, and UHC.
With the GFF “Strategy Refresh” undertaken this
year, the opportunity has come to restore the GFF
to become fully inclusive and capable of targeting
the most precarious problems in GFF countries. In
particular, we would welcome more room for
manoeuvre regarding the allocation of funds to
activities and recipients, such as to health workers,
or to financially support national civil society in
recipient countries.
At the national level, more action needs to be
taken to ensure CPFs are fully inclusive. While
the GFF has started to react to challenges emerging
from malfunctioning CPFs, the proposed solutions
might be insufficient and need to be reinforced.
The ongoing assessment of CPFs is expected to trig-
ger additional pathways and solutions to overcome
this challenge.
The GFF aims to be catalytic in unlocking more
domestic resources for RMNCAH-N in an
equitable manner, promoting public revenue
generation and more efficient spending for
health. To achieve this, the feasible avenues for
governments to increase public domestic
resources and to mobilise additional external
funds for RMNCAH-N need to be placed high on
the agenda. Options for increased health finan-
cing will need to be tailored to specific country
situations, following realistic assessments of the
amounts that can be mobilised via different
pathways. Additional resource mobilisation can-
not rely only on external loans for health as
these will remain insufficient, will need repay-
ment, and may risk substituting domestic gov-
ernment allocations instead of adding to them.
The current COVID-19 crisis calls for an updated
reality check and most probably a revision of
expected financing scopes and timelines.
The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly
increased the vulnerability of people in terms of
socio-economic and health status; it has or will
also hit strongly the ability of health systems to
provide essential RMNCAH-N services, jeopardising
previous achievements, creating additional health
needs and service gaps. Now more than ever, the
GFF’s contribution to fund and support health ser-
vice provision is critical, particularly to attain an
adequate frontline health workforce and to
remove financial access barriers.
To achieve the GFF’s objective of strengthening
health systems of LMICs, the provision of a fit-for-
purpose health workforce needs more attention,
including a dialogue on job creation in resource-
constrained settings. Moreover, the GFF should
promote and support country-specific, proactive
measures to reduce OOP expenditure contributing
significantly to UHC, especially for the most
vulnerable.
Now is the moment for the GFF and its partners
to take stock and adapt, to ensure the ambitions
set five years ago can be realised as soon as poss-
ible, in order not to fail those women, children
and adolescents who are in dire need of better
access to care.
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